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The Theory of Market
and
The Theory of Political Decision
. *Tadahiro U ematsu
I Prologue to A Theory of The State
It seems indisputable that one of the most serious problems with
which public economics and welfare economics are now confronted is
"theory of the state". Economics, for a long time, has paid attention
to the market, and tried to analyse the rational behavior of consumers
(1)
and firms that come onstage. It is well- known that one of the most
important contributions made in this area of "market theory" were the
studies about existence and stability of competitive equilibrium, and
about the relation between competitive equilibrium and Pareto optima-
lity. And it seems that these studies are now going ahead toward the
construction of extensive theories containing some initially excluded
assumptions - such as externalities, uncertainties, and transaction
costs.
But it should be noticed that the market itself, however it may be
treated abstractly, could not exist independently. The market, indeed,
* The author is instructor in the school of law and literature of Okayama
University. The author is very 'grateful to Prof. Mary McCrimmon and Mr.
Telber Gustafson fOT corrections of the grammatical errors contained in the
draft. The remaining errors are, naturally, the responsibility of the author,
however.
( 1 ) See, for example, Arrow and Hahn (1) chapter 1.
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exists as it is determined to be by many other factors. So the structure
of the mark;et also cannot help changing, if the frameworks restricting
the market happen to change. In the area of the market theory,. it
is the (dis) externalities and the public goods that make us realize
this fact completely. Suppose, for instance, some economic unit J, a
producer, by air pollution, has a disadvantageous effect on another
economic unit, some consumers, K. Then, both should have, besides
their present transactions on the market, some direct negotiations (bar-
gaining, merger etc.) or ask for the arbitration of a third party
about this activity (governmental legislation, tax-subsidy policy, deci-
sions of justice etc.). And, as we have found in case studies, the most
knotty problem in this discussion is that the cost of clearing up the
pollution would have to be charged to J or K, according to whether
we define the environmental property rights as belonging to K or f.
In such a case the validity of pareto optimality looks weak. Suppose
we define them as belonging to f. What on earth does the Pareto
optimum mean if we say that the present position is a Pareto optimum,
so K must compensate J in order to make J stop its activities of air
pollution; while K is suffering from a serious disease due to the
pollutant? Here do we not need the "theory of political decision-
making", assisted by the human hand or based upon explicit value
judgement, instead of the harmonious "theory of market" led by an
invisible hand ?
Next, let us consider public goods. It is well-known, by the sugges-
tions of Samuelson (1), Musgrave (5) etc., that in order to deter-
mine the optimum supply of public goods and the optimum tax-sharing
upon each consumer, we have to resort to a social welfare function
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based on some specific economic unit's value judgement or some poli-
tical methods under the voting system, in so far as we reject the
ability-to-pay approach to taxation resting on interpersonal comparisons
of utility.
The need for political decision, however, should not be limited to the
above cases. When we· wish to determine the "equitable" distribution
of incomes among all members of society; when we wish to define
the "merit goods" of Musgrave (5); or, more generally, when we
wish to determine the appropriate frameworks to put limitations upon
the market, such as the permissible extent of oligopoly, level of mini-
mum wage rate, "proper" social security level for the weak, and the
selection on trade-off relations in all these cases, the theory of
political decision, in addition to the market theory, should be called for.
Now let us compare the theory of political decision with the market
theory in order to make more distinct our objects of study. We have
already pointed out that attention is paid to the "market", and consu-
mers and firms are the economic units that enter there in the market
theory. Each of these units wants to maximize its own objective func-
tion -- utility or profit -- with the given resources (incomes) and
production facilities which it has already procured. On the other hand,
e2)
it is the "assembly" that is the center of attention in the political
decision theory, and the political units which occupy the stage are
citizens and political parties. What the citizen possesses is "civil,
e3)
political rights" and what a party holds is "freedom of political activi-
( 2 ) It should be noticed that the term of "assembly" used here is extremely
abstract, corresponding exactly to the abstractness of "market" in market
theory.
( 3 ) In some cases one ballot for voting, but not restricted to this.
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ties". Now what are the objective functions of a citizen and a party?
They do not seem necessarily clear in comparison with "utilities and
profits". Is the object of a citizen also utility? (Buchanan and Tullock
( 2 » Is that of a party, winning elections? (Downs)
Next, in the market theory, the parameter is price, and according
to what theories state, the market will be cleared up if the price
mechanism is sufficiently flexible, and furthermore "a competitive
co
allocation is in the core" (Debreu and Scarf ( 3». On the other hand,
the parameter in the political decision theory is probably "power", and
power negotiation among citizens (parties) will make some (not neces-
sarily consistent) political decisions. It is worth noticing that in the
"assembly", the coalition of various types of units would be all but
indespensable to be effective. It is such coalition that make possible
all kinds of citizens' movements,· party activities, and the action of
pressure groups, and that, at the same time, make more complicated
and difficult the political decision theory than the market theory.
I shall take up, in extremely restricted forms, these various aspects
of political theory - which I should like to call the "theory of the
state" -- in the sequential papers. This paper,as a first step, will
take up -- using the most simple models -- one of the differences
between the two theories.
11 The Most Simplified Competitive Equilibrium
(4) "An allocation is in the core if it cannot be recontracted out by any set
of consumers S. i. e. if no set of consumers S can redistribute their own
initial supply among themselves so as to improve the position of anyone
member of S without deterioration of that of any other." (Debreu and
Scarf (3) p. 238)
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The most simplified example of a competitive equilibrium may be
given by Edgeworth's boxdiagram. Suppose there are two goods X
and Y, and two persons I and I whose initial endowments of both
goods are expressed as (Xi'yi) and (Xj, Y j ). We assume that both
persons have "well- defined" preferences which are shown by two
indifference maps h 12, ...... , and II, 12, ....... (See diagram 1 which
locates I in the bottom left-hand corner and I in the upper right-hand
corner. We measure X on the abscissa from the left for I and from
the right for I, and Y on the ordinate from below for I and from
above for ]. ) .The initial situation when I and I enter the market is
indicated by point A. Since each individual is assumed to behave as a
pricetaker in the "perfect competitive market", we have only to persue
the responses of both persons when the relative price of two goods
changes. It is obvious that neither person will trade unless the relative
price falls in between PI and P4. Furthermore it may easily be under-
stood that since both want to occupy the best position (maximizing
their utilities), individual I will select the points on the curve exten-
ding from A to R through C, D and E, while I will select the points
on the curve from A to S, as the relative price changes. (Notice that
the indifference curves are tangent to the price lin~s at each point of
AR and AS.) We shall call them I' s offer-curve and J' soffer-curve.
Now, it is a proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium that
these two offer-curves indeed have at least one point of intersection
(5)
in this case. At the same time, the proposition that "a competitive
equilibrium is a Pareto optimum" will be proved also, since at the
equilibrium point D, both persons' indifference curves (I3, 12) are
( 5 ) See Nikaid6 (6) for the rigorous proof in a general case.
- 59-
60
_---~--._--------_,. 001'
Vi
Fjg.l
xj
,<--------,.....---,.:-.------...,01
vi
0,
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I,
I
I
---1---------------
I
pz
Xl
Fi9.2
y~J
tangential to each other, or in other words, the equilibrium point is on
(6)
the "contract curve".
(6) By the way, since the contract curve is equivalent to the core in Edge-
worth's boxdiagram, another proposition, namely that "a competitive
equilibrium is in the core", can be proved also.
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Next, we may be able to prove the stability of this equilibrium by
the same boxdiagram. See figure 2 with the same notations as
figure 1. Suppose that the relative price shifts to pz from the
equilibrium price P3. Then individual I will select point C, according
to the same logic as before, while J will select the point E. In this
situation these two persons' demands are expressed by (X/ i , Y/ i ) and
(X'j, Y/ j) , and as is easily shown from the figure, X/i+X'j < Xi
+Xj and Y/i+ Y/ j > Y i + Y j. Then there will be an excess supply for
X of EH, and an excess demand for Y of CH in the market. Thus
the relative price will necessarily change again so that the market
may clear these excess supplies and excess demands i. e. toward the
direction in which the relative price of X will fall. Consequently pz
will begin to draw near P3 again. Thus we see a proof of stability in
this simple example.
Well, one of the most conspicuous characteristics of the "market
theory" is that both I and J will expect to make themselves better off
than their initial position by their market negotiations, so long as the
market equilibrium will fall in the area surrounded by II and Jl
curves. The market is the place of voluntary participation and nobody
makes himself worse off by his negotiations in the market.
J[[ The Most Simplified Political Allocation
The most simplified example of allocation and distribution based
on the political process will be illustrated by a society composed of
three citizens. Since some stimulating examples have already been
given in Buchanan and Tullock (2), we shall make some extentions
of their study.
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Let us suppose a society composed of three farmers has some
political projects concerning cultivation. All three are assumed to be
equally situated, but the productivities of their farms differ. They are
urged to decide whether they will or will not take part in some project
of joint production. Let us look at these assumptions in more details.
I. Three farmers -- 1, 2 and 3 -- are equally situated except
the productivities of their farms.
]I. As to the fertilizer investment, each farm has the following
differential production function with decreasing returns to scale:
Yl=!l(Xl), Yz=!z(xz), Y3=!3(X3):
!i(Xi) >0, f'i(Xi) >0, !"i(Xi)<O for all Xi>O
!i(O) =0, !i(OO) = 00, f'i(O)=CXJ, !'i(OO) =0, (i=l, 2, 3)
!1(X»!Z(X»!3(X) for all x>O.
(Here Xi shows input of fertiliz;er, Yi output for the i person, each
measured in dollar terms. )
Each farm's production has no external or spillover effects on the
others.
]I. In taking part in any project, each farmer is required to pay
k dollars. Since this project is assumed to be a single, isolated deci-
sion, there is no possibility of log-rolling.
Under these assumptions, we shall ask III what situations each
citizen would want to take part in such a project, and what political
situation each would desire. To that end we have to compare several
cases: a) one in which each invests privately k dollars for fertilizer;
b) one in which all three wish to "collectivize" their production with
only unanimity rule; c) one in which they wish to adopt the majority
rule in the allocation or distribution process; and d) th.e case where
- 62-
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one of the farmers possesses dictatorial power. Let us take these cases
up one by one.
a) The private investment case is the most simple. Each person's
benefits are;
If Yi<k, for some person i, then person i may not invest at all,
since he will make himself worse off by investment.
b) Production collectivization is more interesting. In this case, the
optimal resources allocation will be realized by the following procedure;
sub. to. L;Xi = 3 k.
In Lagrangian,
Then the first order condition will be
1'1 (Xl) = 1'2(X2) = 1'3 (X3)
L;Xi=3k.
On the other hand, the second order conditions are met as shown
below:
1"1 (XI) 0 1
0 1"2 (X2) 1 = - [j"I(XI) + /"2(X2)J>0
1 1 0
1"1 (XI) 0 0 1
0 1"2 (X2) 0 1 = - [/"I(XI) • 1"2 (X2) + 1"2 (X2) •
0 0 1"3(X3) 1 . /"3(X3) + /"3 (X3) • /"I(XI)J <0
1 1 1 0
since l"i(Xi) <0, (i=l, 2, 3) and-a
a
l'i(Xi) =0 (j~Z) from assump-
Xj
tion JI. In denoting each optimal imputs as Xl, X2, and X3, the
maximum benefits will be y= L;fi (Xi) subject to 1'1 (XI) = 1'2 (X2) =1'3
-63-
64
(x,) and I::Xi= 3k.
In comparison with case a, case b is obviously feasible, since I::!i
(7)
(Xi) > I::!i(k). But in this case there could occur some serious troubles
about the distribution of outcome, because actually some funds of
those farmers with farms of low productivity have been invested in a
farm (or farms) with high productivity. This aspect is of much inte-
rest and worth more examination.
If the three are quite gentle, and look for unanimous agreement,
they will perform the following distribution.
A
D= {Z], Zz, Z,) I ZI"2.!I(k), z2>!z(k), z,"2.!, (k), I::Zi= y}
(Zi is the i person's benefit, i=l, 2, 3)
( 8)
Note: Even in this case there remain some room, though little, for
A
bargaining about how to distribute y- I::!i(k).
c) The majority decision rule is the most intert'sting. There are
two types of majority decision in this case: one is only about the
distribution after collective production, and the other is about fund
allocation. Both cases can be interpreted as three-person cooperative
games of Von Neumann and Morgenstern.
c-l) In a majority decision with. collective allocation, the three
farmers play this game about the distribution after they perform the
optimal collective production. Then the characteristic function of the
game is:
i) v({l})
ii) v( {I, 2})
=v( {2}) =v( {3}) =0
=v({l, 3}) =v({2, 3}) =y
(7) See Appendix A for proof.
(8) In our specification that Yl = F, yz =~ , and Y, = 1-;;;' (a>b>
c), the difference is Y-~fi (k)=!3k(az +bz +cz) !(a+b+c) k.V a+b+c V
- 64-
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A
v({l, 2, 3})=y
Since the effective sets in this game are obviously {l, 2}, {l, 3} and
{2, 3}, if they agree to the symmetrical sharing of gains, the solution
will be:
( 9)
E={C},}, 0), (~, O,-~), o,}, -~)}
But the situation will be more complicated on account of the differen-
tial productivities which go into the collective production. So the
solution may be generally given as the following discriminatory one:
F= {(Zl, Z2, G3), (ZI, G2, Z3), (GI, Z2,Z3)}
(OS:Gi, zj:2.fj (k), ~Zj+Gi=Y; i, j=l, 2, 3: i~j)
Note: First of all, person i who is subject to discrimination, is assig-
ned Gi by the majority vote of the group, and after that the negotia-
(9) Let us briefly describe the precise definition of the solution in Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern's n-person game.
Denoting vector X= (Xl, X2, , Xn) as the n players' distribution in
the game, any n-tuple X of a real number satisfying the fo\!owing two
conditons (1) individual rationality and (2) Pareto optimality, is called an
imputation of the game with characteristic function v:
(1) v({i})~xi for every iEln={l, 2, , n}
(2) 2JXi = v(In)
Next one imputation Y= (Yl , Y2, , Yn) is said to dominate another
imputation X=(X] , X2, , x n ) with respect to a coalition S (Scln ),
provided that S is not an empty set, and the following two conditions are
met:
(3) v(S)~ 2J Yi
iES
(4) Y-i >Xi for every iES.
The set in such a domination is called an effective set. Finally the set T
of imputations is the solution of the game, if it possesses the following
properties:
(5) No imputation Y in T is dominated by another X in T
(6) Every imputation Z not in T is dominated by at least one imputation
in T.
See also Von Neumann and Morgenstern (8) pp.263-264.
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tion about how to distribute y- Ci between the other two will be carri·
h (10)
ed out. Further the total benefits are y in this case, too.
c-2) If the majority game is performed firstly about the fund allo-
cation, the situation will be a bit different from c-l. The characte-
ristic function is:
=3k
=0=v({3})
=v({2, 3})
i) v ( {l} ) = v ( {2} )
ii) ,v({l, 2}) =v({l,3})
iii) v( {l, 2, 3}) =3k
And the solution is:
3 3 3 3 3 3G= {(2k, 2k, 0), (2k, 0, 2 k ), (0, 2 k , 2k)}
If in each imputation, the losing person would not be asked' to parti-
cipate in production, the maximum output will be achieved by the
following procedure:
sub. to. xi+xj=3k.
(i, j=l, 2, 3: i~j)
Thus, by the same caluculation as before, the following outcomes
will be shown:
Zl + Z2 = f/;l) +!z(;2)
Z'l +Z'3 ,= fl(Xl) +!J(X3)
* *Z"2+ ZI/3= !z(X2) + f3(X3)
Obviously, under assumption
such that /')(Xl) =/'2(;2), Xl+;2=3k.
such that f\(Xl)=/'3(X3), Xl+X3=3k.
* * * *such that /'2 (X2)= /'3(X3), X2+ X3= 3k.
(11)
]I, Zl+Z2>Z'1+Z'3>Z"2+Z'\ i. e.
the [1, 2J coalition would bring the largest benefits, but, of course,
(12)
there is no absolute guarantee for this.
(10) See Von Neumann and Morgensern (8) pp. 288-290, for a discrimina-
tory solution.
(11) See Appendix A for proof.
(12) This is the "without sidepayments case" in Buchanan and Tullock (2).
- 66-
The Theory of Market and The Theory of Political Decision 67
c-3) On the other hand, if the losing person takes part in produc-
tion in exchange for compensation, there will be a negotiation between
the winning coalition and the losing person, and the situation will be
(13)'
quite similar to case b. Then the solution will be given by the set D.
Note: If compensation is not offered by the winning coalition, even
the largest benefits among the above three will be less than that of
A (14)
collective production (ZI+ZZ<Y).
d) Finally, if this society has the characteristics of dictatorial
control, the outcome will, be shown by either of the following:
d-l) collective allocation and dictatorial distribution
K={(y, 0, 0), (0, y, 0), (0, 0, y)}
d-2) dictatorial fund allocation without compensation
L= {(f1(3k), 0, 0), (0, fz(3k), 0), (0, 0, f3(3k»}
d-3) dictatorial fund allocation with compensation, where there
will be a negotiation between the dictator and the others, and the
similar situation to case b will occur.
Note: In cases d-l and d-3, the social benefits are equal, and, gene-
rally, more than in d-2.
Now what implications can we draw from our model ? But before
considering that, let us compare the results of all the above cases.
a) Y = ((fl(k), fz(k), !s(k»}
b) Z3) I zi::c.j.i(k), AD= {(zl, Z2, L:Zi= y)
c-l) F= {(zl, Z2, C3), (zl, Cz, Z3), (cl, Z2, Z3) }
( ci::c.O, zj::c.flk), L:zj+ Ci= Y: i, j=l, 2, 3: i~j)
c-2) H = {(zl, Z2, 0), (z'1, 0, Z(3), (0, z" Z"3) }2,
(13) This is the "with full sidepayments case" in Buchanan and Tullock (2).
(14) See Appendix A for proof.
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c-3) D
d-l) K= ley, 0, 0), (0, y, 0), (0, 0, y)}
d-2) L= {(fl(3k), 0, 0), (0, Iz(3k), 0), (0, 0, !3(3k))}
d-3) D
We can now draw some interesting conclusions from the above
comparison.
In the first place, the largest social benefits y can be realized III
any of the following systems: a unanimous decision system (b);
majority distribution with collective production (c-I); majority alloca-
tion with compensation (c-3); dictatorial distribution with collective
production (d-I); or dictatorial allocation with compensation (d-3).
These cases have the common characteristics of collective production
whether or not there is compensation. It is worth noticing that even
though there are no externalities in production, the largest social bene-
fits are achieved only ifi collective production. This may provide a
motive for cooperation or joint management. But at the same time,
it should be noticed that if the optimal collective production is organi-
zed, the largest social benefits will be realized regardless of the differe-
nt political system (e. g. unanimous agreement, majority decision rule
or dictatorship). In other words, this means that every system can
produce the same largest social benefits. This may be a bit shocking.
Secondly, in the political decision process, even if the social bene-
fits exceed the sum of the outcomes of private investments (y> L:: Ii
(k) ), there could occur a situation in which some person finds
himself worse off than in his private investment for instance, in
majority allocation (c-l) (c-2) or dictatorial allocation (d-2). This
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seems to be an inevitable accompaniment of political process, in cont-
rast to market process where nobody makes himself worse off by
participation in market trade.
Finally, if each person has one ballot based on "political equality",
the dictatorial political system (d) cannot be realized, and one of the
other "games" (b), (c-l), (c-2) or (c-3) will be played. Since the
distribution Zi in F or H could exceed Zi in D, the unanimous distri-
bution project (b) will not necessarily be realized. But in connection
with this, it should be noticed that person 1 will be extremely unwi-
lling to participate in this political project, because his private invest-
ment would carry more benefits except in cases of unanimous distri-
bution' of sufficient compensation or of his dictatorship. On the
other hand, person 3 will be eager to organize this project for the
opposite reason. Then in the distribution according to majority decision
rule F or H, a symmetrical distribution among the members in the
winning coalition cannot be achieved because of the differential pro-
ductiviies of three farm. Here we find a conflict between political
equality and the economically unequal state. And, as observed in our
own actual society, formal political equality is often infringed upon by
the differential economic conditions of the members in society.
IV Some Generalizations
In the preceding section, we dealt with a society composed of only
three persons. Some implications drawn there, however, can be
applied to a society of n persons. Let us denote n differential produc-
tion functions as fl(xl), h(X2), ...... , !n(Xn). Without losing
generality, we can put the same assumptions as before and assume
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11 (X» h(x»·· .. ·····>ln(x) for all x>O. Then the largest social
benefits are achieved by the same procedure as before:
n: i~j)
n
max L: Ii (Xi)
i=!
The first condition is
f'i(Xi) = I'j(xj)
n
sub. to. L: xi=nk.
i=1
(i, j= 1, 2,
n
L: xi=nk.
i=1
The second condition is also met as will be shown in Appendix B.
Furthermore, for N = {l, 2, ...... , n} and .MeN, the following
inequalities will be proved by the same calculations as in the preceding
section:
1)
2)
3)
(Here Xi (~. j) expresses, similarly to before, the optimal imput
into the i (j) farm in production organized by N (M) members.)
Thus it can be shown that the more collectively people are organized
in production, the more social benefits can be realized in contrast with
the private investment. But at the same time, the cumulatively increa-
sing negotiation costs must be taken into consideration in appraising.
the distribution of this result. And we can not simply describe what
kind of coalition will be made or what final imputation will result.
Appendix A
Under the assumption ]I:
li(x;»O, f'i(X;»O, f"i(Xi»O, for all Xi>O;
[.1(0)=0, li(oo)=oo, l'i(O) = 00, 1;(00)=0 (i=l, 2, 3)
11(x»h(x»/3(x), for all x>O,
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the following four formulations are proved together.
a a
1) I: li(Xi» I: li(k)
(=1 i=1
a
2) I: li(XI»/1(3k)
'l=l
- - * *4) II (XI) + Iz(xz) >h (XI) +la(xa) >IZ(X2) + la(xa)
such that
a _ _ * *
I: Xi= xI+xz=xd-xa=X2 +xa=3k.
i=1
1'1 (XI) = f'2(X2) = f'a(Xa), 1'1(;1) = 1'2(;2),
* *1'1 (XI) = f'a(xa), I'Z(X2) = I'a(xa).
Inequalities 1, 2 and 3 can be simply proved by a reduction to
absurdity. Since k+k+k=3k, ;1+;2+0=3k, and h(O)=!a(O)=O, if
either I:Ii (Xi) <I:/i(k) , I:/i(Xi) <II (3k), or I:Ii (Xi) <II (;;1) +h(';;2)
holds, then I:/i(Xi) is not the maximum under I:xi=3k. This leads
to a contradiction of the property of I:/i(Xi).
But let us try another proof.
Lemma li(Xi»f/(Xi) • Xi . for all i and all Xi>O.
Proof. Since from Taylor's theorem, under the above assumptions,
there exist 0<8i<Xi such that li(Xi) = f'i(8i ) • Xi. From the property
of I, l'i(Xi) <f'i(8i). These prove the lemma.
Proof of 1)
In considering l'i(Xi»O, !"i(Xi) <0, for all Xi>O U=l, 2, 3),
from Taylor's theorem, we can find some JLi=8~k+ (l--81)xi (0<8<1)
for all i = 1, 2 and 3, such that
From the assumption, if Xi ~ k, then 1/(JLi)~/l(Xi). Hence,
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Summing up,
2:.Ii (Xi) -- 2:.li(k)>2:.l'i(Xi) (£i- k) = 1'1 (XI) 2:. (Xi- k) = O.
(Q. E. D.)
Proof of 2)
From Taylor's theorem, we caR find some '7=82k+ (1-82).1\ (0<8<1)
such that II (XI) - 11(3k) = 1'1('7) (xl-3k). Thus, in connection with
lemma,
2:.li(xi) - fI(3k) = 1'1 ('7) (£1- 3k) + 2:. Ii (Xi)
i=2, 3
>1\(XI) (xl-3k) + 2:. l'i(X;)· Xi
i=2, 3
(Q. E. D.)
(Q. E. D.)
Proof of 3)
From Taylor's theorem, we can find some A,i=8ixi+(1-8j);i (i=I,2)
and A,3=8;X3 (0<8i<l, for i=l, 2, 3), such that
li(xi) - IJxi) = l'i(A,i) (Xi- ;1) (i = 1, 2)
13 (X3) = 1'3('11,3) • X3.
From the assumptions, if Xi~;i' then l'i(xi)~l'i('II,i) for i=1 and 2,
and from the lemma, 13 (X3) >1'3 (X3) • X3. Hence,
Ii (Xi) - Ii (;;i)>I'i(xi) (X\- ;i) (i = 1, 2)
13 (X3) >1'3 (X3) • X3.
Summing up, we can prove 3).
Proof of 4)
If we prove /1(;;1) +12(;2» II (XI) +13(x3), then the second part
of this inequality will be proved similarly. From the assumptions and
the continuity of function, it is shown that there is a X2 on 12(x2)
such that /2(£2) = 13(x3). Furthermore from Taylor's theorem, we
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(i=l, 2).
Then with the same procedure as before,
L; fi(';i)- L; fi(Xi)= L; [fi(';i)- !i(Xi)]
- i=l, 2 i=l, 3 i=1. 2
(Q. E. D.)
Appendix B
Let us denote f'll(Xl) 0 ------------- 0
o
6
1
F/2(X2)-------- 0
L::--·~:/;:(Xm)
1 ------------- 1
1
1
1
o
as IAml
It was shown that \Az\>O and \A 31<0 in section N. Furthermore,
A m+ l = f'l l (Xl) 0 ------------------ 0 1
0- F/2(X2)------------- 0 1
r--~~---- :
'" :
o 6....----f"m~-~·(Xm+l) 1
1 1----------------- 1 o
1 1 ------------- 1
flll(Xa 0 --·-------0
o
o
o
o
1
f'12(X2)------· 0
t--·--···-- --.. t
o....·.. f"m(x m)
f'12(X2)-- ..---- 0
~··--·~·:::;~~~(Xrn)
1 -------------1
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1
1
o
o
o
o
1
~4
= I"m+l (X m+l) IAm I - II I"i(xi)
i=l
Hence, in considering /"i(Xi) <0, for all i, IA 4 1 >0, IAsl <0,
(Q. E. D.)
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